Cryptography evidenceyour auditor can test.
Qypher finds the keys, certificates and algorithms across your estate that a quantum computer will break, turns them into a signed inventory mapped to IRDAI Control 110, RBI, MAS and the UAE National Encryption Policy, and generates the post‑quantum migration artifacts your team deploys.
- Runs in your environment
- Keys stay in your boundary
- No LLM in the decision path
Qypher/Sample financial institutionIllustrative data- api.paymentsEdge · TLS key exchangeX25519→ X25519MLKEM768RBI · CERT-InStaged
- core-services meshInternal · mTLSECDHE P-256MAS TRMMapped
- customer-vaultKMS · key wrappingRSA-2048 OAEPIRDAI · DPDPVulnerable
- swift-gatewayHSM · signingRSA-3072RBI · SWIFT CSPVulnerable
- policy-docsCode · document signingRSA-2048IRDAI · UAE NEPVulnerable
- partner-apiVendor product · TLSRSA-2048MAS TRMVulnerable
The risk is not the quantum computer. It is the years before it.
Encrypted traffic can be recorded today and decrypted later. If your data has to stay secret longer than your migration will take to finish, you are already exposed. And most banks cannot yet say where their RSA and ECC even live.
Harvest now, decrypt later
The exposure window- How long your data must stay secretKYC, loan files, health and transaction records: 10+ years
- How long an estate-wide migration takesInventory, prioritise, re-key, re-certify, test: typically years
- When a quantum computer could break RSA/ECCUncertain. Regulators are planning around 2030 to 2035
Illustrative. Quantum timing is uncertain; the logic holds whenever it lands.
Where cryptography hides in a bank
Sample estate · illustrativeBuild the inventory, then move key exchange on your longest-lived data flows to hybrid ML-KEM. The standards are final, the order of work is known, and every regulator asks for the same first step: a cryptographic inventory.
The threat is future. The deadline is now.
Migration takes years, harvesting is happening today, and most organizations haven't started. The math of "start now" is not optional.
"We believe cryptographically relevant quantum computers could arrive sooner than previously expected, and the work required to prepare is significant so organizations need to start now."
Mark Russinovich, CTO of Microsoft Azure, Microsoft Security blog (30 June 2026)
Until Singapore CII owners, including major banks, are expected to file a quantum-safe migration plan.
CSA Quantum-Safe Handbook · 31 Mar 2027
The largest cryptographic migration in computing history.
Microsoft, Google, and Cloudflare have all set 2029 as their own post-quantum completion target. Most of the human web traffic Cloudflare serves already uses post-quantum key agreement. The platforms have moved. Most banks have not started.
First Regulatory Cliff
NIST IR 8547, final since October 2026, deprecates all quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms such as RSA and ECC after 2030 and disallows them after 2035. The EU targets high-risk systems by 2030; US federal key exchange is due the same year.
Never Tested Their Edge
51% of enterprises have never formally assessed whether their public-facing infrastructure supports post-quantum key exchange (Axiad, Aug 2026). Most do not know their own starting point.
Breaks All of Today’s Public-Key Crypto
RSA, ECDSA, ECDH and Diffie-Hellman all fall to Shor’s algorithm on a large enough quantum computer, at any key size. Bigger keys do not help.
"Most organizations have no clear picture of where cryptography exists across their applications, infrastructure, legacy systems and data flows. Data being harvested today does not wait for compliance timelines."
Simon Pamplin, CTO at Certes - TheNewStack, July 2026
Organizations already moving to quantum-safe
The leaders have started. Yet Deloitte estimates only 10-15% of large Indian enterprises have even begun structuring post-quantum readiness assessments (Economic Times, Aug 2026). That is the gap Qypher is built for.
Finding broken cryptography is the easy part.
Replacing it is the work.
Quantum-vulnerable → NIST post-quantum · generated artifacts, not just recommendations
- 01
It hands you the fix, not just the finding
Most tools stop at a findings list. Qypher also produces the replacement: ML-DSA keys and certificates, CSRs and hybrid X25519 + ML-KEM TLS configs, staged for your team to push through change control. Applying them with your approval is what we are building next.
- 02
It runs in your environment
On the hosted platform, the agent scans inside your environment and the keys it generates for migration stay there; Qypher receives findings, not keys. Self-hosted and air-gapped modes are available when the whole platform has to sit inside your boundary.
- 03
It maps to your regulators
Each finding is tagged with the rule it touches: IRDAI, RBI, SEBI CSCRF, CERT-In, MAS, CSA, the UAE National Encryption Policy, NIST. An insurer or bank in Mumbai, Singapore and Dubai gets one inventory with three regulator views.
Discover. Score. Plan. Execute. Govern.
The best tools stop at a plan and hand it to your team. Qypher hands you the working migration artifacts, and is building toward carrying out the change with your approval.
See the certificates, algorithms and keys you run
Scanners and agents build a Cryptographic Bill of Materials (CBOM) across external, internal, cloud, code, and vendor systems - so quantum-vulnerable cryptography stops hiding in plain sight.
Product screens are illustrative · Execute & Govern in active development
Most tools hand you a to-do list. Qypher hands you the fix.
Scan-and-report tools stop at a plan and never touch production - by design. Qypher already generates the migration artifacts, and is building agents that carry out the change. When execution ships it will be opt-in, and your keys never leave your environment.
- Your cryptographic estate & production keys
- Run the agent in your environment, or self-host the platform
- You set the mode, scopes, and guardrails
- Keys never leave your boundary
Trust boundary - Qypher reads, plans and generates artifacts inside your environment. When execution ships, it will act only with your permission. Your keys never leave your boundary. Execution engine in active development.
Edge to mainframe. Inventoried.
Quantum-vulnerable cryptography hides in every layer. Today the external scanner covers the public edge, and the internal agent reads code (including mobile, mainframe and HSM integration code), IaC, cloud, binaries, JARs and container images, keystores, databases and Kubernetes. A CI/CD gate blocks new vulnerable crypto at merge.
One agent · six layers · one inventory · illustrative
External Endpoints
Public-facing websites, APIs, payment gateways, partner portals
Internal Services
Microservices, databases, message queues, internal APIs
Cloud Infrastructure
AWS, Azure, GCP. Load balancers, CDNs, serverless functions
Certificates & Keys
TLS certificates, signing keys, CA chains, key stores
Vendor Integrations
Third-party APIs, SaaS connections, payment processors
CI/CD & Code
Build pipelines, container images, hardcoded crypto in source
Four markets mapped today. The rest tracked.
Findings are mapped to India, Singapore, UAE and US requirements today, because that is where the institutions we work with as design partners are regulated. We track the rest so you can see where each deadline sits. Status shows the strongest instrument that exists now, which is not always binding on banks.
India
Mapped- DST/NQM roadmap (CII 2027-29)
- IRDAI Cyber Security Guidelines 2026
- RBI Q-SAFE committee (May 2026)
- SEBI CSCRF
- CERT-In SBOM / CBOM guidelines
Singapore
Mapped- CSA Quantum-Safe Handbook v1.0
- MAS advisory MAS/TCRS/2024/01
- MAS TRM Guidelines
- MAS draft circular P019-2026 (consultation)
UAE / Gulf
Mapped- UAE National Encryption Policy
- National Crypto Discovery Tool
- CBUAE (sector rule pending)
- SAMA quantum circular (Saudi, Aug 2026; being added)
United States
Mapped- NIST FIPS 203 / 204 / 205
- EO 14412 + OMB M-26-15
- CNSA 2.0
- NIST IR 8547 (final, Oct 2026)
European Union
- EU Coordinated PQC Roadmap
- DORA (financial entities)
- ESAs autumn 2026 risk update
- NIS2
United Kingdom
- NCSC PQC migration timelines
- FCA / PRA operational resilience
G7 finance
- G7 Cyber Expert Group roadmap (Jan 2026)
- Six phases to 2035
Europe (national)
- FINMA Guidance 05/2026 (Switzerland)
- Germany national PQC guideline (Oct 2026)
- ANSSI hybrid guidance (France)
Canada
- CCCS PQC roadmap
- Federal planning milestone (2026)
Australia
- ASD PQC guidance
- APRA CPS 234
Japan
- CRYPTREC PQC evaluation
- FSA cyber guidelines
South Korea
- KpqC national PQC programme
Mapped = findings map to this jurisdiction in Qypher today. Others are tracked for reference. Last reviewed 9 Nov 2026.
One transition. Every market, one window.
The world's regulators and largest platforms have converged on the same window. Discovery has to start years before the disallowance date - because migration is measured in years, not months.
India insurers inventory · EU transition begins
IRDAI's 2026 guidelines ask Indian insurers to keep an up-to-date cryptographic inventory for post-quantum readiness. The EU coordinated roadmap asks member states to begin the transition by end-2026, and EU supervisors named quantum a key risk in September.
Singapore plans · Swiss roadmaps · India CII
Singapore CII owners, including major banks, file a quantum-safe migration plan with CSA by 31 Mar 2027, and MAS proposes that every financial institution have one by end-2027. FINMA recommends PQC roadmaps from Swiss banks and insurers by mid-2027, under a board-adopted strategy. India's DST roadmap asks CII to lay foundations by Dec 2027 (advisory). US CNSA 2.0 applies to new national-security acquisitions.
India CII quantum-safe · Big Tech
India's DST roadmap targets full PQC adoption for Critical Information Infrastructure by Dec 2029. Microsoft, Google and Cloudflare target their own completion the same year.
US federal key exchange · Singapore critical · EU high-risk
EO 14412: US federal key establishment on PQC by 31 Dec 2030. MAS proposes Singapore FIs migrate critical systems by the same date. The EU targets high-risk systems by end-2030. NIST IR 8547 (final, Oct 2026) deprecates all quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms after 2030.
Singapore CII complete · US signatures
CSA milestone: vulnerable cryptography no longer in use across Singapore CII by 31 Dec 2031. EO 14412: US federal digital signatures on PQC, and NSA CNSA 2.0 mandated for national-security systems, by the same date.
Proposed end-state
NIST IR 8547 (final, Oct 2026) disallows quantum-vulnerable public-key cryptography after 2035. The G7 finance roadmap and UK NCSC both aim to complete migration by 2035.
India insurers inventory · EU transition begins
IRDAI's 2026 guidelines ask Indian insurers to keep an up-to-date cryptographic inventory for post-quantum readiness. The EU coordinated roadmap asks member states to begin the transition by end-2026, and EU supervisors named quantum a key risk in September.
Singapore plans · Swiss roadmaps · India CII
Singapore CII owners, including major banks, file a quantum-safe migration plan with CSA by 31 Mar 2027, and MAS proposes that every financial institution have one by end-2027. FINMA recommends PQC roadmaps from Swiss banks and insurers by mid-2027, under a board-adopted strategy. India's DST roadmap asks CII to lay foundations by Dec 2027 (advisory). US CNSA 2.0 applies to new national-security acquisitions.
India CII quantum-safe · Big Tech
India's DST roadmap targets full PQC adoption for Critical Information Infrastructure by Dec 2029. Microsoft, Google and Cloudflare target their own completion the same year.
US federal key exchange · Singapore critical · EU high-risk
EO 14412: US federal key establishment on PQC by 31 Dec 2030. MAS proposes Singapore FIs migrate critical systems by the same date. The EU targets high-risk systems by end-2030. NIST IR 8547 (final, Oct 2026) deprecates all quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms after 2030.
Singapore CII complete · US signatures
CSA milestone: vulnerable cryptography no longer in use across Singapore CII by 31 Dec 2031. EO 14412: US federal digital signatures on PQC, and NSA CNSA 2.0 mandated for national-security systems, by the same date.
Proposed end-state
NIST IR 8547 (final, Oct 2026) disallows quantum-vulnerable public-key cryptography after 2035. The G7 finance roadmap and UK NCSC both aim to complete migration by 2035.
Sources: NIST IR 8547 · US EO 14412 (Jun 2026) · NSA CNSA 2.0 · EU Coordinated PQC Roadmap · India DST/NQM roadmap · public vendor commitments.
Questions, answered.
What Qypher does, how the migration works, and how post-quantum readiness fits together.
Qypher's scanners and agents find the cryptography across your infrastructure - external endpoints, internal services, cloud, code, and vendor integrations - score each one for quantum exposure, generate a regulator-ready Cryptographic Bill of Materials (CBOM), produce a prioritised migration plan, and generate the actual migration artifacts - PQC keys, certificates, CSRs, and hybrid-TLS configurations - staged in your environment for your team to deploy. Orchestrated execution, where Qypher makes the change with your approval and rolls back on failure, is what we are building next.
See where you stand on quantum risk.
Share your domain and we'll run a quantum-exposure assessment with you - surfacing vulnerable cryptography and a prioritised path to fix it. No cost, no commitment.
May we use analytics to see how the site is used? That means Google Analytics cookies and PostHog session replays, with anything you type masked. No advertising. Details